Patients' rights, medical error and harmonisation of compensation mechanisms in Europe by Watson, K. (Kenneth) & Kottenhagen, R.J.P. (Rob)
european Journal of health law 25 (2018) 1-23
brill.com/ejhl
 
 
© Kenneth Watson and Rob Kottenhagen, ���7 | doi �0.��63/�57�8093-��460348
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the prevailing CC-BY-NC license at the time of 
publication.
Patients’ Rights, Medical Error and Harmonisation 
of Compensation Mechanisms in Europe
Kenneth Watson
Independent Healthcare Consultant; Doctoral candidate, Institute of Health 
Policy and Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam,  
The Netherlands
watson@bmg.eur.nl
Rob Kottenhagen
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands
Abstract
In 1999 the Institute of Medicine reported that most medical injuries relate to unavoid-
able human error in a context of system failure. Patient safety improves when health-
care providers facilitate blame-free reporting and organisational learning. This is 
at odds with fault-based civil liability law, which discourages a more open (doctor-
patient) communication on medical injuries. The absence of a clear-cut definition of 
‘medical error’ complicates litigation and hence swift, appropriate patient compensa-
tion. No-fault systems perform better in this respect. A dual track liability system for 
medical malpractice is challenging to implement and operate, yet may be the only 
option for Pan-European harmonisation of medical liability.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Doctor-patient Relationship, Healthcare Quality and Patient Safety
The doctor-patient relationship is shaped by the quality and manner of infor-
mation exchange. This is a delicate process with case-specific relational and 
communication elements,1 which all affect deliberation and decision-making 
on the most appropriate course of care. Despite greater patient access to 
medical information clinical practice is still characterised by considerable 
physician-patient information asymmetry.2 Conscientious efforts for more 
effective implementation of the informed consent doctrine3 as codified in 
the European Convention on Human Rights & Biomedicine,4 the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU)5 and national or case law of 
EU Member States6 remain essential to enhance patient autonomy.7 Especially 
in a paternalistic hospital environment reinforcing the patient’s capacity and 
competency to consent isn’t a luxury.8 In this context poor doctor-patient in-
teraction and suboptimal sharing of ‘essential’ medical information are com-
mon causes of patient dissatisfaction. There is ample empirical evidence of a 
strong correlation between communication failures and medical malpractice 
1   E.J. Emanuel et al., ‘Four models of the physician-patient relationship’, JAMA 267 (1992) 1222; 
G. Elwyn et al., ‘Shared Decision Making: A Model for Clinical Practice’, Journal of General 
Internal Medicine 27 (2012) 1361.
2   D.L. Frosch et al., ‘Authoritarian Physicians and Patients’ Fear of Being Labeled ‘Difficult’ 
among Key Obstacles to Shared Decision Making’, Health Affairs 31 (2012) 1030-1038.
3   C. Grady, ‘Enduring and emerging challenges of informed consent’, New England Journal of 
Medicine 372 (2015) 855-862; E.S. Spatz, ‘The New Era of Informed Consent’, JAMA 315 (2016) 
2063.
4   See Arts. 5, 8, 9 and 10.
5   See Art. 3.
6   See e.g. Arts. 7:448-449 Medical Treatment Agreements Act (NL); Art. L. 1111-2 CSP (F) 
and Cass. Civ. (1), 23 January 2014, no. 12-22123 (F); Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management 
Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582 and Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board (2015) UKSC 11 (UK).
7   S.F. Birkeland, ‘Informed Consent Obtainment, Malpractice Litigation, and the Potential Role 
of Shared Decision-making Approaches’, European Journal of Health Law 24 (2017) 264-282.
8   R. Heywood et al., ‘Patient perceptions of the consent process: qualitative inquiry and 
legal reflection’, Journal of Professional Negligence 24 (2008) 104. Patients perceive informa-
tion disclosure by doctors as an effort to dodge liability rather than as sincere facilitation 
of their well-informed, genuine consent to their treatment. The Supreme Court’s landmark 
ruling in Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Board (2015) reinforced patients’ rights in the UK; see 
M. Campbell, ‘Montgomery v Lanarkshire Board’, Common Law World Review 44 (2015) 
222-228.
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litigation.9 Physicians find it difficult to gauge what sort of information 
patients exactly require and when the ‘right’ level of understanding is achieved 
to render their consent legally and ethically valid.10 Analyses of the commu-
nication and behaviour of physicians, who never experienced a malpractice 
lawsuit, and those, who had previously been sued, reveal that the latter have 
deficient interpersonal skills. They often struggle to develop (emotionally) 
meaningful interactions with patients.11
There is no difference in quality of care involved.12 A recent literature review 
on the role of shared decision-making in reducing medical litigation supports 
this observation. Professional arrogance and failure to diagnose or respect 
patient preferences put clinicians at higher risk of litigation, in particular 
when they also make little effort to enhance patient understanding of possible 
treatment harms and benefits.13 Statistics show only a small minority of doctors 
is complaint/claim-prone. Yet they account for a disproportionally large 
number of malpractice lawsuits.14 Prospective identification and proactive 
peer counselling and/or monitoring of these ‘bad apples’ might result in less 
litigation and better healthcare.15
This is important in the context of (improving) patient safety and patient 
satisfaction, as the volume and complexity of medical interventions steadily 
9    C. Vincent et al., ‘Why do people sue doctors? A study of patients and relatives taking 
legal action’, Lancet 343 (1994) 1609-1613; H.T. Stelfox et al., ‘The relation of patient satis-
faction with complaints against physicians and malpractice lawsuits’, American Journal of 
Medicine 118 (2005) 1126-1133; D. Roter, ‘The patient-physician relationship and its implica-
tion for malpractice litigation’, Journal of Health Care Law & Policy 9 (2006) 304-314.
10   R. Heywood et al., ‘Informed consent in hospital practice: health professionals’ perspec-
tives and legal reflections’, Medical Law Review 18 (2010) 152.
11   N.C. Meruelo, ‘Mediation & Medical Malpractice’,  Journal of Legal Medicine 29 (2008) 289.
12   W. Levinson et al., ‘Physician-patient communication. The relationship with malpractice 
claims among primary care physicians and surgeons’, JAMA 277 (1997) 553-559.
13   M. Durand et al., ‘Can shared decision-making reduce medical malpractice litigation? 
A systematic review’, BMC Health Services Research 15 (2015) 167-178.
14   D.M. Studdert et al., ‘Prevalence and Characteristics of Physicians Prone to Malpractice 
Claims’, New England Journal of Medicine 374 (2016) 354-362. ‘Approximately 1% of all phy-
sicians accounted for 32% of paid claims’; M.M. Bismark et al., ‘Identification of doctors at 
risk of recurrent complaints: a national study of healthcare complaints in Australia’, BMJ 
Quality and Safety in Health Care 22 (2013) 532-540. ‘(…) 3% of Australia’s medical work-
force accounted for 49% of complaints and 1% accounted for a quarter of complaints’.
15   T.H. Gallagher et al., ‘Physicians with multiple patient complaints: ending our silence’, 
BMJ Quality and Safety in Health Care 22 (2013) 521-524; see also supra note 14.
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increase and patients become less risk-tolerant and more aware of their rights.16 
Physicians experience growing pressure to perform according to professional 
standards/guidelines and to meet best practices in patient-centred care.17 
Medical progress raises patient expectations of treatment success. Failure is 
not an option. This ambiance fosters their belief that medical accidents result 
from individual carelessness, negligence or substandard care rather than from 
coincidental events or system errors.18 This is however, a fallacy. In 1999, the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) report To Err is Human19 documented that in prac-
tice, most medical errors are simply caused by unavoidable human error in a 
context of system failure.20 ‘Errors result from faulty systems, not from faulty 
people’.21 Under these circumstances, legal action and punishment backfire by 
incentivising doctors to conceal errors, which are part of human fallibility. This 
neither reduces their occurrence nor improves overall safety in patient care.22 
On the contrary, it promotes practising ‘defensive medicine’ to avert liability in 
case of malpractice suits.23 As a consequence healthcare costs increase with-
out improving health outcomes.24 Health economists agree that, if even aver-
age doctors perform medically unwarranted diagnostic tests or treatments to 
16   OECD, Medical Malpractice. Prevention, Insurance and Coverage Options, Policy Issues in 
Insurance no. 11 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2006) p. 25.
17   H.M. Krumholz, ‘Informed consent to promote patient-centered care’, JAMA 303 (2010) 
1190-1191.
18   D.H. Sohn, ‘Negligence, genuine error and litigation’, International Journal of General 
Medicine 6 (2013) 49-56. ‘Negligence is failure to meet a standard level of care. It is an 
incorrect decision. (…) A system error, on the other hand is an occasional, simple human 
error. Deterrents cannot reduce these errors, because they are made unintentionally’.
19   L.T. Kohn et al., To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System (Washington, DC: Institute 
of Medicine, 1999).
20   Ibid. The IOM defines error as ‘the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended 
(i.e. error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e. error of planning)’. 
A system is ‘a set of interdependent elements that interact to achieve a common aim’.
21   L. Leape, ‘Non-Punitive Approach to Prevention of Medical Errors’, Journal of Oral & 
Maxillofacial Surgery 63 (8, Supplement) (2005) 16.
22   D.G. Stevenson et al., ‘Does litigation increase or decrease health care quality? A national 
study of negligence claims against nursing homes’, Medical Care 51 (2013) 430-436.
23   US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Defensive medicine and medical malprac-
tice (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994) p. 13.
24   M.M. Mello et al., ‘National costs of the medical liability system’, Health Affairs 29 (2010) 
1569-1577; H. Nys, ‘The Factual Situation of Medical Liability in the Member States of the 
Council of Europe’ in: Report to the 2008 Council of Europe Conference ‘The Ever-Growing 
Challenge of Medical Liability: National and European Responses’ (Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, 2009) pp. 17-41.
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reduce their exposure to malpractice liability, the cure is worse than the disease 
from society’s point-of-view.25 Still this is not uncommon in the United States 
(US)26 and the United Kingdom (UK).27 In 2015 the British Medical Association 
(BMA) expressed concerns, that doctors practiced medicine more defensively 
and were driven more by fear of litigation than by fear of being reported to the 
regulator.28 This is not different in the rest of Europe.29 It raises the question 
whether and how traditional fault-based civil liability systems or their no-fault 
alternatives should be adapted to effectively cope with the developments in 
cost-conscious, patient safety-oriented 21st century healthcare.
1.2 How to Compensate Medical Injuries?
When suffering an injury or experiencing an adverse outcome during 
medical treatment, a patient may sue his doctor for malpractice and seek 
compensation. His country of residence determines whether his claim is 
handled within a contractual or tort liability system or a no-fault system. In the 
first situation, he is financially compensated when it is proven that negligence 
caused his injury. This implies his treatment was not in line with the required 
and generally accepted professional standard.30 Contractual and tort liability 
root in the assumption, that the defendant’s culpable fault underlies the injury 
of the claimant31 and demands monetary compensation. In a no-fault system 
evidence of a causal relationship between treatment and injury constitutes 
the basis for compensation.32 There is broad agreement in the medicolegal 
literature that contractual and tort liability systems do not engage physicians in 
25   H. Scherz et al., ‘Defensive Medicine: A Cure Worse Than The Disease’, Forbes Magazine, 
27 August 2013.
26   A.B. Jena et al., ‘Physician spending and subsequent risk of malpractice claims’, BMJ 351 
(2015) h551.
27   O. Ortashi et al., ‘The practice of defensive medicine among hospital doctors in the United 
Kingdom’, BMC Medical Ethics 14 (2013) 42.
28   A. O’Dowd, ‘Doctors increasingly practice “defensive” medicine for fear of litigation, says 
regulator’, BMJ 350 (2015) h87.
29   P. Bertoli, Medical Malpractice in Public Healthcare Systems (Rotterdam: Erasmus Univer-
sity Rotterdam, 2014) pp. 39-45; V. Di Gregorio et al., ‘Defensive medicine in Europe: which 
solutions?’, European Journal of Public Health 25 (Supplement 3) (2015) 145.
30   Supra note 18, p. 49.
31   In the US the person starting a civil action is called plaintiff; in the UK (and the rest of 
Europe) claimant.
32   However, doctors remain professionably accountable. Supra note 7, p. 6; see also K. Wallis 
et al., ‘New Zealand’s 2005 ‘no-fault’ compensation reforms and medical professional 
accountability for harm’, The New Zealand Medical Journal 126 (2013) 33-44.
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improving healthcare. No-fault systems however enhance their participation 
in institutional efforts to address system errors/failures and increase patient 
safety.33 The following paragraphs discuss key elements of both systems.
2 Medical Error and Legal Remedies for Damages: Tradition or 
Innovation?
In general terms tort law is organised around corrective justice,34 distribu-
tive justice35 and prevention or deterrence. The latter plays a prominent 
role in how physicians interact with patients. As only doctors are in the po-
sition to take (additional) precautionary measures to reduce the probability 
and/or severity of injury, most medical accidents are unilateral from a legal 
perspective.36 Usually the patient has no influence on suffering injury, and 
plays a negligible role.37 In a vast majority of medical malpractice cases the 
claimant is a patient and the defendant a doctor. Hence medical malpractice 
is probably the area of tort law in which empirical evidence best supports the 
role of tort liability in providing economic incentives (for measures) to prevent 
medical injuries. Most relevant data on this subject relate to the US health-
care system.38 Considering the major differences in culture and institutional 
context between the US and (many countries in) Europe,39 extrapolation of 
American findings to Europe warrants caution and careful scrutiny.
33   D.M. Studdert et al., ‘No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries. The Prospect for Error 
Prevention’, JAMA 286 (2001) 217-223; M.M. Mello et al., ‘Who pays for medical errors? An 
analysis of adverse event costs, the medical liability system, and incentives for patient 
safety improvement’, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 4 (2007) 835.
34   Corrective justice is based on the concept that ‘individuals who are responsible for the 
wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair the losses’; see A. Beever, ‘Corrective Justice 
and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2008) 477.
35   Distributive justice relates to (financial) compensation, which the injurer (defendant) 
provides to the victim (claimant) for any damage the victim suffered as a consequence of 
the injurer’s unduly risky behaviour.
36   B.C.J. van Velthoven et al., ‘Medical liability: do doctors care?’, Recht der Werkelijkheid 33 
(2012) 28-30. In a bilateral accident both parties can be held accountable for their role in 
causing damage.
37   Ibid. Exceptions may involve situations in which patients do not take their medication 
as prescribed or refuse to faithfully comply with life style rules in line with their doctor’s 
instruction.
38   Mello et al., supra note 33.
39   The institutional context involves amongst others medical liability insurance, the struc-
ture and financial management of healthcare (institutes), codes of professional conduct 
for medical practitioners and national regulation of quality & safety standards.
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The inconsistent definition of medical error in the medicolegal literature 
complicates correct interpretation of US/EU data. Generally, it is not clear to 
what extent negligence is involved: a crucial factor in any medical malpractice 
lawsuit. From a legal point-of-view it is essential to differentiate injury 
caused by treatment from injury caused by the disease itself. In a landmark 
publication on the results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS), 
Brennan et al. introduced the term adverse event for ‘an injury that was 
caused by medical management (rather than the underlying disease) and that 
prolonged the hospitalisation, produced a disability at the time of discharge, 
or both’. Negligence was defined as ‘care, that fell below the standard expected 
of physicians in their community’. Adverse events were reported in 3,7% of 
all hospitalisations. Negligence was present in only 28% of those;40 see Fig. 1. 
The majority of patients suffering adverse events is therefore not eligible for 
compensation through the (tort) litigation system. This was the first publication 
providing solid empirical evidence of thousands of adverse events in regular 
healthcare each year. It received international recognition for its scientific 
quality and is widely cited.41 In a follow-up paper the same group of investigators 
reported that patients claimed compensation in less than 40% of adverse 
event cases involving clearly negligent care.42 At best just half of these claims 
was deemed potentially successful in the usual, complicated and acrimonious 
legal procedure.43 As the high incidence of adverse events revealed that 
complications are an inherent feature of medical interventions rather than the 
result of unnecessary faults by careless physicians, the impact on the political 
40   T.A. Brennan et al., ‘Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients: 
results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I’, New England Journal of Medicine 324 
(1991) 370-376. A doctor often precribes an antibiotic in case of a serious bacterial infec-
tion. This may cause an unforeseeable allergic reaction with the patient and subsequent 
kidney failure. If so, the kidney failure constitutes an adverse event. This is by definition 
not negligence.
41   Google Scholar reports around 5000 hits (26 January 2017). It is considered ‘the best-
known study of the epidemiology of medical injury and malpractice claiming’; see D.M. 
Studdert et al., ‘When Tort Resolutions Are “Wrong” Predictors of Discordant Outcomes 
in Medical Malpractice Litigation’, The Journal of Legal Studies 36 (S2) (2007) S47-S78.
42   A.R. Localio et al., ‘Relation between malpractice claims and adverse events due to neg-
ligence’, New England Journal of Medicine 325 (1991) 429; see also A. Kachalia et al., ‘New 
Directions in Medical Liability Reform’, New England Journal of Medicine 364 (2011) 1564-
1565. ‘The best estimates are that only 2-3% of patients injured by negligence file claims, 
only about half of claimants recover money, and litigation is resolved discordantly with 
the merit of of the claim (i.e. money is awarded in nonmeritorious cases or no money is 
awarded in meritorious cases) about a quarter of the time’.
43   Ibid.
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and legal landscape was significant. Interest in non-negligence based forms 
of compensation gained more traction. The effectiveness of tort litigation’s 
quality assurance role in healthcare and specifically the appropriateness of 
deterrence as a tool to discipline physicians in how they practise medicine was 
challenged.44 The observation from malpractice insurers (US) that less than 
1% of all medical malpractice cases delivered a verdict favouring the claimant45 
provided further empirical support for this. Another analysis on the outcomes 
of malpractice litigation (US) confirmed this statistic.46 In the US the tort 
liability system is therefore consistently criticised for being unfair, slow and 
(too) costly.47 It fails to (justly) compensate patients who suffered injury from 
proven negligent care, and perversely incentivises defensive medicine.48 The 
44   Supra note 22, p. 435; see also infra note 84.
45   Supra note 18, p. 51.
46   A.B. Jena et al., ‘Outcomes of medical malpractice litigation against US physicians’, 
Archives of Internal Medicine 172 (2012) 892-894. About 45% of all cases did not progress 
to litigation. Only 4,5% of all cases ended in a jury verdict; 80% favored the physician. 
Cases the physician won took 39 months; those the claimant won 43,5 months.
47   Mello et al., supra note 24.
48   D.P. Kessler, ‘Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and Options for Reform’,  Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 25 (2011) 93-110; see also supra note 18, p. 51.
Figure 1 Relationship between (preventable) error, negligence and 
(preventable) events
Source: T.P. Hofer et al., What is an Error’, 
Effective Clinical Practice 6 (2000) 265
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medical malpractice crises in the US in the mid-seventies originated in its 
dysfunctional protection of patients and its excessively high costs. The first 
problem still exists.49 Tort reforms involving caps on compensation of non-
economic damages were however effective in cost reduction.50 Mediation led 
to successful cost containment and more frequent acceptance of the outcome 
by both parties.51 Arbitration was subject of controversy.52 Scholars proposed 
removing medical malpractice claims from the tort system and establishing 
‘health courts’ with medically savvy judges to deter frivolous litigation and 
prevent miscarriages of justice.53 This is in line with the growing consensus in 
the medicolegal literature that implementation of a no-fault system is in the 
interest of claimants, doctors and society as a whole.54
The US and Europe face similar challenges in coping with medical malprac-
tice. There are, however, fundamental differences in legislation and regulations 
with respect to compensation of injured patients.55 Although also in Europe 
most malpractice claims are settled in court, some countries take into account 
49   D.A. Hyman et al., ‘Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Global Perspective: How 
Does The US Do It?’, Chicago-Kent Law Review 87 (2012) 163-198; M.M. Mello et al., ‘The 
Medical Liability Climate and Prospects for Reform’,  JAMA 312 (2014) 2146-2155.
50   S. Amaral-Garcia, Quantifying the Economics of Medical Malpractice. A View from a Civil 
Law Perspective, Doctoral Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 
2011; chapter 3; see also Kachalia et al., supra note 42, p. 1566.
51   S.J. Szamania et al., ‘Alternative dispute resolution in medical malpractice. A survey of 
emerging trends and practices’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly 26 (2008) 71-96.
52   D. Shieh, ‘Unintended Side Effects: Arbitration and The Deterrence of Medical Error’, New 
York University Law Review 89 (2014) 1806-1835.
53   A.B. Kachalia et al., ‘Beyond negligence: Avoidability and medical injury compensa-
tion’, Social Science & Medicine 66 (2008) 387-402; M.M. Mello et al., ‘“Health Courts” and 
accountability for patient safety’, The Milbank Quarterly 84 (2006) 459-492.
54   H.R. Clinton et al., ‘Making patient safety the centerpiece of medical liability reform’, New 
England Journal of Medicine 354 (2006) 2205-2208; see also Mello et al., supra note 49 and 
infra notes 57 and 58.
55   U. Magnus, ‘Why is US Tort Law so Different?’, Journal of European Tort Law 1 (2010) 
102-124; see also K. Oliphant, ‘Medical Malpractice and Compensation: Comparative 
Observations’, in K. Oliphant et al. (eds.), Medical Malpractice and Compensation in 
Global Perspective (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013) p. 514. ‘… liability law in the United States 
has a number of special features that make it somewhat untypical, and limit its utility as 
a comparator in cross-jurisdictional investigation, amongst them the role of the jury in 
deciding upon liability and assessing the damages, the availability of punitive damages, 
the rule that each party should bear its own legal costs, win or lose, the largest role played 
by contingency fees, and the availability of extensive pre-trial procedures to require the 
disclosure of documents and the taking of witness statements’.
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that most medical injuries are not negligently caused and do not qualify for 
compensation via litigation. With due consideration for patients’ rights to ad-
equate redress for iatrogenic injuries they established separate administrative 
compensation schemes to facilitate (easy access to) out-of-court settlements.56 
Via this route claims are processed (more) efficiently57 and satisfactorily.58 
When fault and/or causation is/are difficult or impossible to prove, patients’ 
needs and (legal) interests are better served. In Scandinavia no-fault systems 
basically compensate all medical injuries via collective entities (e.g. patient 
insurance systems) and prevail over tort litigation.59 Since 2002 French law 
also allows compensation of (serious) harm that is inherent to certain medi-
cal procedures, occurred without fault of the practitioner and could not be 
controlled.60 In these legally well-defined circumstances (no-fault) strict li-
ability applies as an exception to fault-based liability, which still underlies 
the majority of malpractice cases.61 The new regulation was the endpoint of a 
56   Kachalia et al., supra note 53, p. 388. ‘Each of the Nordic countries (…) have abandoned 
their negligence-based compensation systems (…). The shifts were motivated largely by 
perceptions that the tort system’s adversarialism, combined with the highly specialized 
knowledge and fact-finding needed in medical injury claims, made the resolution process 
too long and expensive. A related impetus was concern that the tort system’s cumber-
some nature impaired patients’ access to due compensation’.
57   K. Essinger, ‘Medical liability: alternative ways to court procedures’, in: Report to the 2008 
Council of Europe Conference ‘The Ever-Growing Challenge of Medical Liability: National 
and European Responses’ (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2009) pp. 42-57 ‘The percentage 
of claims solved by courts is less than 1% in Scandinavian countries, 2% for ONIAM in 
France and 4% for the Litigation Administrative Authority in England. In Germany 40% 
of claims are solved in courts, in France 60% (most of that is insurance companies) and 
in Italy 86%’.
58   Ibid., p. 48. ‘Administrative countries or systems are based on special patient right leg-
islation regarding medical injuries. They use administrative procedures out of court for 
claims handling to a very low cost and probably much shorter median times for decisions. 
They solve 98%-99% of claims out of court’.
59   V. Ulfbeck et al., ‘Malpractice in Scandinavia’, Chicago-Kent Law Review 87 (2012) 111-129; 
see also supra note 57.
60   G. Helleringer, ‘Medical Malpractive and Compensation in France. Part II: Compensation 
Based on National Solidarity’, Chicago-Kent Law Review 86 (2011) 1126; L. Ancelot et al., 
‘Physician-patient relationship and medical accident victim compensation: some 
insights into the French regulatory system’, European Journal of Health Economics 16 
(2015) 529-542; and S. Taylor, Medical Accident Liability and Redress in English and French 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) chapters 2 and 5.
61   Ibid., Taylor, pp. 27-28; see also supra note 57.
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fierce national dispute between all stakeholders involved, the Conseil d’Etat,62 
the Cour de Cassation63 and the French government on better compensation 
for (more) injured patients and stabilisation of liability costs for insurers and 
healthcare providers.64 In 2010 Belgium implemented a comparable two-track 
system after it adopted more or less similar legislation.65 The National Health 
Service (NHS) Redress Act, which the UK Parliament approved in 2006 to facili-
tate a more fair out-of-court redress scheme for injured patients,66 was how-
ever not (fully) implemented.67 Instead the UK government(s) took various 
measures to reduce the frequency and severity of malpractice claims against 
the state-run NHS.68 Still both number and costs of medical negligence claims 
rise at a significant rate.69 Italy is confronted with the same problem(s).70 
 
62   The Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) is the highest administrative court in France.
63   The Cour de Cassation (Court of Cassation) is the highest civil court in the French 
judiciary.
64   S. Taylor, ‘The development of medical liability and accident compensation in France’, in: 
E. Hondius (ed.), The Development of Medical Liability (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) pp. 70-107.
65   T. Vandersteegen et al., ‘Physician Specialists’ Perceptions of the Medical Malpractice 
System in Belgium’, European Journal of Health Law 22 (2015) 481-491.
66   Taylor, supra note 60, p. 14. ‘Redress would ordinarily comprise compensation and/or a 
package of care or treatment, the provision of an explanation, an apology, and providing 
the patient with a report on the action which had been, or would be taken to prevent 
similar cases arising in the future. Damages under the scheme would be likely to be lim-
ited to £ 20,000’.
67   Taylor, supra note 60, p. 15. The NHS Redress Act was only partly implemented in Wales.
68   Taylor, ibid., pp. 10-11. These measures involved (1) the introduction of an obligatory pro-
tocol to promote out-of-court settlements of claims and avoiding litigation, and (2) the 
withdrawal of legal aid for the majority of medical negligence claims.
69   Ibid. In England the National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA) indemnifies 
English NHS Trusts against claims. In 2013/2014 there were 11,945 claims; in 2008/2009 
6,088. In 2013/2014 the NHSLA paid ± £ 1,244 million to settle claims; in 2006/2007 ± £ 580 
million.
70   Bertoli, supra note 29, pp. 45-50. In 2011 the Italian Association of Insurance Companies 
(ANIA) reported a 252% increase in the number of malpractice claims against physicians 
from 9,567 (1994) to 33,682 (2010). The number of claims filed against hospitals rose with 
236%. See also D.M. Toraldo et al., ‘Medical Malpractice, Defensive Medicine and Role of 
the “Media” in Italy’, Multidisciplinary Respiratory Medicine 10 (2015) 12 ‘(…) Italy has the 
highest proportion of health lawsuits settled in court in Europe (more than 90%), way 
ahead of France (60%) and Germany (40%) and is accordingly in last place concerning 
health lawsuits settled out of court’.
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In the absence of specific statutory law to regulate the physician-patient re-
lationship, a physician’s obligation towards patients is governed by principles 
of contract law. Injured patients can either sue the physician or the hospital.71 
In Spain administrative law applies for medical accidents in the public health 
system.72 The Civil Code is the main body of applicable law for harm in private 
healthcare.73 This legal structure may however, not be legal practice:
Although apparently there are different liability rules applicable accord-
ing to the place of accident, case law shows that these differences have 
no practical effect. Courts base their decisions on the evidence of negli-
gence; even if the injury took place in a public hospital a strict liability 
rule will not be applied.74
Even so, the number of actions before administrative courts is growing faster 
than the number of litigations at civil courts.75 This is also the trend in France.76 
Civil Code provisions are the basis for German medical malpractice law;77 just 
71   Bertoli, supra note 29, pp. 34-38; see also A. Feola et al., ‘Medical Liability: The Current 
State of Italian Legislation’, European Journal of Health Law 22 (2015) 347-358.
72   S. Amaral-Garcia et al., ‘Do Administrative Courts Favour the Government? Evidence from 
Medical Malpractice in Spain’,  Journal of European Tort Law 6 (2015) 246-248; see also 
M.P. Garcia Rubio et al., ‘The Development of Medical Liability in Spain’, in: E. Hondius 
(ed.), The Development of Medical Liability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
pp. 160-187.
73   Ibid.
74   Amaral-Garcia, supra note 72, p. 247.
75   M. Castellano Arroyo et al., ‘Medical Responsibility and Liability in Spain’, in: S.D. Ferrara 
et al. (eds.), Malpractice and Medical Liability. European State of the Art and Guidelines 
(Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2013) pp. 161-187; P. Giraldo et al., ‘A retrospec-
tive review of medical errors adjudicated in court between 2002 and 2012 in Spain’, 
International Journal for Quality in Health Care 27 (2015) 1-7; see also supra note 72.
76   Infra notes 126, 129.
77   M.S. Stauch, ‘Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Germany’, Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 86 (2011) 1143: ‘Under the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], the patient 
generally has the choice of bringing an action in contract or in tort (or in both)’. Hospitals 
are vicariously liable for actions and/or omissions of employees; see also M.S. Stauch, 
‘The 2013 German Patients’ Rights Act — Codifying Medical Malpractice Compensation’, 
Journal of European Tort Law 6 (2015) 85-94. In 2013 the German Parliament enacted 
the Patients’ Rights Act (Patientenrechtegesetz) into law, which codified German case 
law on medical injury liability rules within the BGB as a new codal subsection entitled 
‘Treatment Contract’ (Behandlungsvertrag). This reaffirmed contract law as the primary 
legal basis for malpractice litigation. ‘(…) from the perspective of the patient, there is now 
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like in Poland78 and the Netherlands.79 The number of malpractice claims in 
Germany is among the highest in Europe. During the past decade, however, 
only 8% resulted in litigation involving breach of contract. ‘The rest are settled 
by the doctor/hospital’s liability insurer or abandoned, in some cases follow-
ing adjudication by an arbitration board’.80 Overall most European countries 
address medical malpractice primarily via fault-based contract and/or tort 
law.81 Also in Europe the legal focus is primarily on doctors’ duties and less 
on patients’ rights. Compensation of injured patients depends on proving the 
doctor’s negligence and its causal relationship with their personal injury: a 
(medically) complex and daunting task.
3 Compensation via No-fault Systems: A Mixed Bag
Compared to contract and tort litigation, no-fault systems appear to re-
sult in more quick, more fair and more reliable compensation of injured 
patients.82 They operate independently of courts. Proof of negligence is not 
required. Facilitation of blame-free reporting and evaluation of medical er-
rors by healthcare providers is considered their most compelling advantage. 
This is essential to improve organisational learning, healthcare quality and 
a specific part of the Civil Code to which they can refer for their key entitlements in rela-
tion to (injurious) medical treatment’ (p. 94).
78   K. Baczyk-Rozwadowska, ‘Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Poland’, Chicago-
Kent Law Review 86 (2011) 1217-1261. Injured parties in Poland prefer the tort liability 
regime.
79   E. Hondius, ‘Medical Liability in The Netherlands’, in: E. Hondius (ed.), The Development 
of Medical Liability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 137 ‘The Dutch legis-
lature has opted for the private law solution and within this for contract and not tort as a 
basis’.
80   Stauch 2011, supra note 77, p. 1162; see also Law Library of Congress, Medical Malpractice 
Liability: Germany, June 2009; last updated 6 June 2015. ‘Medical malpractice claims are 
mostly settled with the liability insurers, often after mediation services of the medical 
associations or the social health insurers have given expert opinions. (…) German awards 
for tangible damages are low because most of the losses resulting from personal injury are 
borne by the social security system’.
81   Supra note 57, p. 43; see also C.M. Romeo-Casabona, ‘The legal approach to medical liabil-
ity. Negligence and breach of patient’s autonomy’, in: Report to the 2008 Council of Europe 
Conference ‘The Ever-Growing Challenge of Medical Liability: National and European 
Responses’ (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2009) pp. 109-119.
82   J. Dute, ‘Medical Malpractice Liability: No Easy Solutions’, European Journal of Health 
Law 1 (2003) 85-90; Kachalia et al., supra note 53.
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patient safety.83 Critics dispute these observations and are concerned about 
their (potential) undermining of tort law’s deterrence and damage-preventive 
effect.84 Erosion of physician accountability may expose patients to more 
rather than less risk of harm. Health-economists argue that no-fault systems 
may be associated with significantly more claims and hence even higher 
healthcare costs; unless compensation is capped at a lower level than current 
tort awards.85 They doubt whether this serves the interests of injured patients.86 
Finally legal scholars question the compatibility of a fully-fledged no-fault sys-
tem with (positive obligations of) the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR), if this would deny injured patients access to courts.87 This seems 
an academic concern rather than a legal reality. In European countries with 
operational no-fault systems injured patients can also be compensated under 
the rules of contract and/or tort law.88
In 1975 Sweden was the first Scandinavian country to adopt a ‘no-fault’ 
system.89 Initially it involved a patient insurance scheme with a voluntary and 
private character.90 In 1997 the Patient Injury Act (PIA) placed it on a statutory 
footing.91 Care providers are legally obliged to have patient insurance to cover 
liability for injury compensation.92 Patients can file claims without incurring 
83   Studdert et al., supra note 33. For specific (dis)advantages of ‘no-fault’ systems see 
A.M. Farrell, No-Fault Compensation Schemes for Medical Injury: A Review (Scottish 
Government Social Research, 2010).
84   B.R. Furrow, ‘The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation As A Curative 
Tool’, Drexel Law Review 4 (2011) 41-107.
85   T. Vandersteegen et al., ‘The impact of no-fault compensation on health care expendi-
tures: An empirical study of OECD countries’, Health Policy 119 (2015) 367-374.
86   Supra note 48, p. 104.
87   S.A.M. McClean, No-Fault Compensation Review Group. Report and Recommendations. 
Volume I (Edinburgh: The Scottish Government, 2011) chapters 4 and 5. This concerned 
Articles 2, 6, 8, 13 ECHR.
88   Ulfbeck et al., supra note 59, p. 116. Denmark is the exception among the Scandinavian 
countries. For information on France see Helleringer, supra note 60. For information on 
Belgium see supra, note 65.
89   Finland followed in 1987, Denmark in 1988 and Norway in 1992.
90   Farrell, supra note 83, p. 32. Swedish hospitals established an insurance company for med-
ical injuries to avoid court procedures and to compensate patients more satisfactorily.
91   Ulfbeck et al., supra note 59, p. 114. Originally Patientskadelag (Svensk författningssam-
ling [SFS] 1996:799), which in English is mostly referenced as Patient Injury Act. Finland 
adopted a similar Act in 1986. Norway followed in 2001 and Denmark in 2010.
92   Under the Health and Medical Services Act (1982) 17 county councils and 4 regional 
bodies are responsible for most medical services. Their common insurer, Landstingens 
Ömsesidiga Försäkringsbolag (LÖF; The County Council’s Mutual Insurance Company) 
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legal expenses. They are compensated, if upon subsequent evaluation their 
injury ‘could have been avoided’;93 for instance with an equally effective, yet 
intrinsically different medical procedure or treatment.94 In line with the Tort 
Liability Act (1972) a patient can also opt to go to court.95 The insurer’s patient 
insurance then works as a liability insurance.96 In practice 99,9% of all claims 
is solved out of court.97 Health care professionals appreciate the PIA because 
it allows ‘blame-free’ reporting and analysis of medical errors, and does not 
involve punitive sanctions (in court) nor any disciplinary action by the Swedish 
Medical Responsibility Board (Hälso- och Sjukvårdens AnsvarsNämnd; HSAN).98 
In case of an unforeseen medical accident, they feel comfortable to encourage 
and even support injured patients to get compensation.99 Publications on 
the overall performance and social acceptance of the Scandinavian no-fault 
handles all patient malpractice claims. Since private care providers have contracts with 
the county councils, they fall under the same insurance scheme. A patient can apply to 
the Patientsförsäkringsföreningen (Patient Insurance Association), if a care provider lacks 
patient insurance; see H. Johansson, ‘The Swedish system for compensation of patient 
injuries’, Upsala Journal of Medical Sciences 2010; 115: 88; A. Anell et al., ‘Sweden: Health 
System Review’, Health Systems in Transition 14 (2012) 1-159; and supra note 59, pp. 114-115.
93   Farrell, supra note 83, p. 40.
94   This is known as ‘the alternative rule’. LÖF’s daughter company Personskaderegelering 
[(PSR); Swedish Medical Injury Insurance (SMII)] processes more than 90% of all claims. 
About 45% of them qualify for compensation. If PSR’s decision and/or the proposed com-
pensation isn’t acceptable for the patient, he/she can appeal to the Patients Claims Panel 
(PCP). Although PCP’s opinion is advisory, the insurer in principle always acts accord-
ingly. In only 10% of the appeals PCP reaches a different conclusion than PSR. A patient 
can make a final appeal at the (Swedish) Court of Appeal. This is an arbritation process. 
The Court’s decision is final and binding; see supra note 92 (Johansson, p. 89); see also 
World Bank, Medical Malpractice Systems Around the Globe: Examples from the US Tort 
Liability system and the Sweden-No-fault System (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003) p. 11.
95   Supra note 59, p. 116. This applies to all Scandinavian systems except for the Danish 
system.
96   Ibid. ‘The few malpractice cases that do go to court, therefore most often concern injuries that 
the patient insurance does not cover’.
97   Farrell, supra note 83, p. 35; see also Di Gregorio, supra note 29: ‘In countries where a no-
fault system (…) is in force, most of the litigations are disputed out of the court of law: the 
claims resolved in court are 0.1% in Sweden, 0.3% in Finland, 0.5% in Denmark (…)’.
98   Still there are mechanisms to deter medical malpractice. Supra notes 32, 59 (Ulfbeck et al., 
p. 113), 82 (Dute, pp. 88-89) and 92 (Anell, pp. 45-47).
99   World Bank, supra note 94.
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systems indicate, that they enjoy a fair degree of support and are efficient in 
terms of cost and time.100
Until 2002, French patients had to sue their healthcare provider(s) to obtain 
compensation for treatment-related injuries. Proof of fault was indispensable 
for success.101 Administrative courts handled claims for injuries in state-run 
public hospitals. Civil courts judged cases involving private practitioners or 
institutions.102 Disparities in their handling of similar claims were common, 
led to manifest injustice and in the end also contributed to a ‘national crisis’ 
involving patients, physicians, institutions, insurers and even the Conseil d’Etat 
and the Cour de Cassation.103 In 2002 the French Parliament enacted major 
reforms via legislation (i.e. the Kouchner Act),104 clarified and harmonised 
existing medical malpractice liability rules,105 and created a complementary 
100   Supra note 87, p. 32; see also M. Erichsen, ‘The Danish Patient Insurance System’, Medicine 
& Law 20 (2001) 355-369.
101   For review of medical liability in France before 2002 see Taylor, supra note 64, pp. 77-92.
102   Taylor, supra note 60, pp. 28-30. The French secondary healthcare sector consists of pub-
lic, private non-profit and private profit-oriented hospitals. In 2011 there were 938 public 
hospitals with 255,758 beds and 1,747 private clinics, providing 156,239 beds. Primary care 
is private. The relationship between patient and primary care doctor or private clinic is 
contractual.
103   Taylor, supra note 60, chapters 2, 5. The Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d’Etat did not 
(fully) respect each other’s case law. Liability costs for insurers skyrocketed after the 
Perruche case. Insurance premiums for ‘high-risk physicians’ (e.g. obstetricians and sur-
geons) exploded. Patients lamented about excessively high litigation costs and the long lag 
time between filing a claim and obtaining a court decision. Politicians felt, that the rules for 
medical liability had become unfair and too complex. France was copying the American 
litigation culture; see also D. Thouvenin, ‘French Medical Malpractice Compensation 
since the Act of March 4, 2002: Liability Rules Combined with Indemnification Rules 
and Correlated with Several Kinds of Proceedings’, Drexel Law Review 4 (2011) 166-167; 
J. Barbot et al., ‘ “No-fault” compensation for victims of medical injuries. Ten years of 
implementing the French model’, Health Policy 114 (2014) 237-245.
104   The legislation involved 1) Loi no. 2002-203 du 4 mars 2002 ‘relative aux droits des malades 
et à la qualité du système de santé’ (Loi Kouchner) [Law nr. 2002-203 of March 4 2002 on 
Patients’ Rights and Quality of the Health System Act’ (Kouchner Act)] and 2) Loi no. 
2002-1577 du 30 décembre 2002 ‘relative à la responsabilité civile médicale’ (Loi About) [Law 
nr. 2002-1577 of December 30, 2002 on Medical Civil Liability (Law About)]. The latter law 
became known as the Revised Kouchner Act.
105   F. G’Sell-Macrez, ‘Medical Malpractice and Compensation in France. Part I: The French 
Rules of Medical Liability since the Patients’ Rights Law of March 4, 2002’, Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 86 (2011) 1095.
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legal route to get compensation ‘quickly’ and more easily.106 Its provisions were 
incorporated in the French Code de la santé publique (CSP; Public Health Code). 
This established the current French no-fault scheme. It has the same liability 
basis for healthcare professionals in the public and private sector.107 The 
traditional fault-based liability rules were not abandoned.108 Art. L 1142-1 CSP 
unambiguously reaffirms the principle that healthcare professionals109 and 
organisations can only be liable on the basis of fault.110 In line with Art. L 1142-2 
CSP they should now all carry civil liability insurance.111 Whether an injured 
patient initiates a procedure within the new no-fault scheme or files a lawsuit 
for negligence under the traditional administrative, civil and criminal liability 
regimes, the initial stage remains fault-oriented in both situations. He can even 
pursue similar claims in parallel.112 ‘Litigation and out-of-court settlements are 
106   This route fits the French socio-legal tradition to facilitate the compensation of accident 
victims as a mechanism of social solidarity and loss distribution. Nevertheless it only 
compensates harm, that was the consequence of ‘the occurence of an accidental risk inher-
ent to the medical procedure and which occurred without any fault of the practitioner and 
could not be controlled’. This includes claims for so-called ‘aléa thérapeutique’; see supra 
notes 60 (Helleringer), 60 (Taylor, p. 25; pp. 61-63) and 103 (Thouvenin; pp. 176-186).
107   Supra note 105, p. 1097. ‘The Patients’ Right Law of March 4, 2002, modifies the legal basis 
for medical liability, which is now regarded as a “legal regime” that is neither contractual 
nor tortious. This change has been very recently confirmed in an important decision of 
the Cour de Cassation on January 28, 2010, which merely mentions Article L 1142-1 of the 
CSP without referring to Article 1147 of the Civil Code like previous decisions usually did’; 
see also Taylor, supra note 60, p. 30. ‘Recent case law has confirmed that (…) medical acci-
dent liability law is now considered by the courts as a statutory liability (‘responsabilité 
légale’) independent of contract’.
108   According to Art. 1382 of the (French) Civil Code one is liable for the harm caused to 
another by one’s fault.
109   The list of health professionals includes amongst others doctors, dentists, midwives, 
pharmacists and nurses.
110   Supra note 64, pp. 27, 29-30, 37-42. This article, however, also provides for exceptions to 
fault liability for harm (e.g. accidents, caused by a defective medical product or a hospi-
tal-acquired infection) to shield health professionals and liability insurers from excessive 
liability that was established in previous case law from the Conseil d’Etat and the Cour de 
Cassation; see also supra note 105, pp. 1098-1099.
111   Until 2002 this was not compulsory. The new rule ‘forced’ insurers to also cover ‘high-risk 
physicians’. Articles L 1142-25 and 26 CSP provide for criminal sanctions in the absence 
of insurance; see P. Pierre, ‘The Role of Insurance in Compensation for Medical Injuries 
since the Kouchner Act’, Drexel Law Review 4 (2011) 155; see also supra note 105, p. 1118.
112   This is in accordance with Art. 6 ECHR. Access to the courts is a fundamental right with 
no exceptions. See supra notes 60 (Taylor, p. 24) and 87.
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two separate ways of seeking compensation, even though victims will not be 
compensated twice for the same medical injury’.113
To start a procedure under the no-fault scheme a seriously injured patient114 
must submit his case to a Commission Régionale de Conciliation et d’Indemnisa-
tion [CRCI; Regional Conciliation and Compensation Commission]115 to assess 
not only whether his harm was an abnormal consequence of the medical act 
or omission given his prior health status and its foreseeable evolution116 but 
also whether his harm reached the legally required level of seriousness.117 The 
CRCI is strict in rejecting cases not fulfilling both criteria.118 Lack of (nation-
al) uniformity and consistency in the interpretation of the legal definition 
of ‘medical accident’ however was and still is a structural weakness in the 
procedure.119 Only cases, that meet the legal threshold, undergo full medical 
expert review to validate the patient’s harm, its causes as well as its nature 
and extent.120 The report is subject of a public, full case CRCI-examination, 
113   Barbot et al., supra note 103, pp. 238-241.
114   If the medical accident caused the patient’s death, this can be done by a relative or legal 
representative. Patients with ‘minor’ injuries cannot start this procedure. They have to 
sue for damages in court.
115   In line with Art. L 1142-6 CSP a CRCI is chaired by a judge and comprises representatives 
of patients, health professionals and insurers. Décret no. 2014-19 of 9 January 2014 capped 
the number of members to 12; see Thouvenin supra note 103, pp. 176-185 for review of their 
responsibilities and functioning.
116   Harm, which may be in line with the natural progression of a patient’s illness, does not 
constitute a medical accident; see Taylor, supra note 60, pp. 99-100.
117   Art. D 1142-1 CSP; see Taylor, supra note 64, p. 94. ‘An accident will be considered as suf-
ficiently serious where the victim experiences a predefined minimum level of injury as a 
result of the accident. (…) The minimum level of invalidity required to benefit from the 
scheme is set at 24%. A medical accident will also fulfill the criteria of seriousness where 
the patient suffers a temporary inability to work for six months, or, exceptionally, where 
the victim is declared permanently inapt to exert his chosen profession, or where the acci-
dent causes him ‘particularly serious problems’, which can include financial problems’.
118   Taylor, supra note 60, pp. 58, 104, 110-112. For 2013 37% of cases was rejected. In 62% of 
those the harm was judged to be not sufficiently serious. The decision’s validity is ques-
tionable. Most claims are poorly documented. CRCI decisions are often ‘only’ based on a 
simple medical certificate by the family doctor, without a (second) opinion of a specific 
medical expert and without a hearing.
119   Taylor, supra note 60, pp. 101-104.
120   Ex Arts. L 1142-11 and 12 CSP CRCI’s select experts from a national list of competent 
medical experts, as established by the Commission Nationale des Accidents Médicaux 
[CNAMed; National Commission on Medical Accidents]. For characteristics and role of 
experts see Thouvenin, supra note 103, pp. 180-183; and CNAMed, Rapport au Parlement et 
au Gouvernement. Année 2013, pp. 8-12.
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which precedes its decision on the applicable compensation regime.121 In case 
of fault the insurer (of the healthcare provider) is to pay the compensation;122 
in case of no-fault the Office National d’Indemnisation des Accidents Médi-
caux (ONIAM; National Office for the Compensation of Medical Accidents).123 
ONIAM also compensates the claimant if the insurer refuses to pay or the in-
surance policy does not cover the damage.124 Since CRCI decisions are not le-
gally binding,125 the insurer, ONIAM and even the patient may still opt to take 
the case to court afterwards: ‘secondary litigation’.126 The increasing number 
121   CRCI’s don’t determine the level of compensation! Ex Art. L 1142-6 CSP the claimant can 
comment on expert observations and conclusions. CRCI’s decide by consensus or by vote. 
Ex Art. L 1142-8 CSP a CRCI must reach a final decision within 6 months after the start of 
the procedure. In 2013 this took on average 7,8 months, while compensation was awarded 
in 44% of accepted cases. If the claimant disagrees with the CRCI’s damage assessment, 
he can end the procedure and sue for damages in court. However if his lawsuit is not suc-
cessful, he will receive no compensation at all; see supra notes 60 (Taylor, pp. 56-58), 103 
(Barbot et al., pp. 238-243) and 103 (Thouvenin, p. 185).
122   Ibid. Ex Art. L 1142-14 CSP the insurer must offer the claimant a settlement payment 
within 4 months after the CRCI decision. Upon his acceptance the insurer should pay 
him within a month. This is a transaction in line with art. 2044 of the (French) Civil Code, 
and hence ends any subsequent litigation based on the same claim. If the claimant deems 
the insurer’s offer unsatisfactory, he can take the insurer to court; see also Ancelot, supra 
note 60, p. 532.
123   Ex Art. L. 1142-17 CSP. Publications in English also refer to ONIAM as the ‘Public Guarantee 
Fund’, as it is state-funded through taxation and social security. In 2013 and 2014 ONIAM 
complied with the CCRI’s decision in 91,7 and 91,1% of cases respectively. If a claimant 
considers ONIAM’s settlement proposal not sufficient, he can sue ONIAM ex Art. L 1142-20 
CSP. This is rare. In 2014 97% of claimants accepted ONIAM’s offer. For review of ONIAM’s 
legal background, funding and functioning see ONIAM, Rapport d’Activité 2014 and supra 
notes 60 (Helleringer) and 111 (Pierre, pp. 151-164).
124   In this situation ONIAM acts as financial guarantor and sort of (public) ‘not-for-profit 
insurer of last resort’. Ex Art. L 1142-14 CSP ONIAM can take the insurer to court to have 
these expenses reimbursed.
125   Thouvenin, supra note 103, p. 184. The Conseil d’Etat (in 2007) and the Cour de Cassation 
(in 2010) ruled that CRCI’s ‘are administrative commissions whose mission is to facilitate, 
by preparatory measures, a possible amicable settlement of disputes related to medical 
accidents. Because a Commission pronounces an opinion, both Courts agree that the 
opinion issues by a Commission does not bind the insurer’.
126   Art. L 1142-20 CSP. In case of fault the patient can also sue for damages in the criminal 
courts. Under French criminal law a doctor is criminally liable for a patient’s harm upon 
proof of fault, causation and harm.
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of actions contesting CRCI- and/or ONIAM-decisions in court127 suggests that 
the quality and consistency of decision-making on key elements of the no-
fault scheme are subject of growing (legal) controversy.128 It illustrates how the 
legal complexity of (implementing) an administrative compensation scheme 
to better facilitate claims of (the most seriously and vulnerable) injured pa-
tients with due consideration for its financial sustainability compromises its 
transparency, fairness and acceptance. The French experience is an example of 
how operating a no-fault scheme in the context of traditional civil liability law 
may gradually lead to an even more tangled web of (sometimes contrasting) 
rules with different liability principles for separate patient categories;129 see 
Fig. 2. From this perspective it is surprising that, despite the remarkable growth 
in the complexity and number of medical acts — and hence an inherent surge 
in medical accidents —, litigation rates did not increase accordingly in the past 
decade.130 It is tempting to attribute this to the inversely proportional growth 
in the number of cases submitted to and processed by CRCI’s.131 Although this 
relationship has so far not been formally validated, the observation itself con-
firms that an out-of-court settlement scheme can operate effectively as a credi-
ble and patient-friendly alternative next to redress through the courts.132 Over-
all its performance did also not negatively affect the overall positive opinion of 
French patients about their health system.133
In 2010 Belgium introduced a similar dual track liability system for medical 
malpractice.134 Its legal basis, structure and operation resemble the French 
127   ONIAM, supra note 123, pp. 28-29. Claimants have to sue ONIAM for CRCI judgements. 
Art. L 1141-20 CSP does not allow court actions against the CRCI, because its judgements 
are defined as merely preparatory for ONIAM’s decision. The number of court actions ver-
sus ONIAM at completion of the no-fault procedure grew from 751 in 2011 to 1421 in 2014.
128   This relates to legal unclarity about the access criteria for the no-fault scheme; see supra 
notes 60 (Taylor, chapter 5) and 103 (Barbot et al., p. 244).
129   The existence of separate administrative and civil courts and their legally unrestricted 
application of different rules to different patient categories is in itself a source of legal 
uncertainty.
130   Taylor, supra note 60, pp. 81-82, 85-87.
131   ONIAM, supra note 123, pp. 20-21. This number rose from 1719 in 2003 to 4479 in 2014. 
Between 2010 and 2014 compensation was awarded in 32-36% of these cases.
132   S. Taylor, ‘Providing Redress for Medical Accidents in France: Conflicting Aims, Effective 
Solutions?’, Journal of European Tort Law 2 (2011) 57-76.
133   K. Chevreuil et al., ‘France: Health System Review’, Health Systems in Transition 12 (2010) 
42. ‘(…) 80% of patients were satisfied with the current organization and funding basis of 
the health care system (…)’; see also L Degos et al., ‘Can France keep its patients happy?’, 
BMJ 336 (2008) 254-257.
134   Supra note 65; infra note 136.
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system. Its no-fault scheme involves a Fund for Medical Accidents (FMA), 
which indemnifies patients in case of non-negligent injuries with abnormal 
and serious harm.135 In the absence of adequate, published data and statistics 
on its performance little is known about its effectiveness in achieving 
the government’s objective with respect to improving patient (access to) 
compensation.136
4 Conclusion
Following the IOM’s reporting, that most medical errors result from faulty 
systems rather than from individual carelessness or professional negligence, 
structural improvement of patient safety became one of the EU’s health-
care priorities.137 The EU recognised ‘that just and blame-free reporting and 
learning systems have proven to be excellent tools to increase patient safety 
culture’.138 This is at odds with traditional fault-based civil liability law.139 It 
may increase patients’ trust in physicians, yet this does not affect their propen-
sity to sue.140 More disclosure of medical injury to patients is associated with 
more litigation.141 As long as healthcare providers are not exempt from civil li-
ability when reporting legally sensitive fault-related information, their cooper-
ation to improve organisational learning and hence patient safety will remain 
135   Ibid.; see also Taylor, supra note 60, p. 103. The Belgian criteria for ‘seriousness’ apply to 
entitlement for no-fault compensation and not for access to the no-fault scheme itself as 
in France.
136   T. Vandersteegen, Essays on the Medical Malpractice Reform in Belgium. A Law and 
Economics Analysis (Hasselt: University of Hasselt, 2016).
137   Council of the European Union, Council Recommendation of 9 June 2009 on patient 
safety, including the prevention and control of healthcare-associated infections, Official 
Journal of the European Union 52 (2009) 1-6, Notice No 2009/C 151/01; see also European 
Commission, Patient Safety and Healthcare Associated Infections. Report of the Commission 
to the Council [COM (2014) 371].
138   Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on patient safety and quality of care, 
including the prevention and control of healthcare associated infections and antimicro-
bial care, Official Journal of the European Union 57 (2014) 8 Notice No 2014/C 438/05.
139   O. Quick, ‘Patient safety and the problem and potential of law’, Journal of Professional 
Negligence 28 (2012) 82.
140   A.W. Wu et al., ‘Disclosing medical errors to patients: It’s not what you say, it’s what they 
hear’,  Journal of General Internal Medicine 24 (2009) 1012-1017.
141   D.M. Studdert et al., ‘Disclosure of Medical Injury to Patients: An Improbable Risk 
Management Strategy’, Health Affairs 26 (2007) 215-226.
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troublesome.142 No-fault systems perform better in this respect with Sweden 
as classic example.143 In Sweden victims of medical accidents have full access 
to traditional litigation, yet practically all cases are settled out of court; often 
with (full) support of their physician(s).144 This may relate to the fact that all 
patients are entitled to no-fault compensation.145 France and Belgium restrict 
this to the most serious cases. Even then these patients still face legal hurdles 
and uncertainties to establish their eligibility. The French system however also 
provides evidence of (growing) social acceptance and (legal/financial) viability 
of (introducing) a no-fault compensation scheme in a country with a histori-
cal tradition of malpractice litigation in courts. Pan-European harmonisation 
of medical liability rules may seem illusory,146 yet the relative ‘success’ of the 
transitional French system suggests it is not impossible.
142   Taylor, supra note 60, pp. 152-156.
143   Supra note 87, p. 32. The promotion of safety and quality of care by learning from medical 
error and moving away from attributing blame are among the legal and social goals of the 
Swedish system.
144   Ibid. Health practitioners facilitate 60-80% of all claims.
145   This also applies to other Scandinavian countries and New-Zealand.
146   V. Paskalia, ‘Cross-border Healthcare in the EU: And What if Something Goes Wrong?’, 
European Journal of Health Law 23 (2016) 1-16.
